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II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James W. Clark appeals from the district court's decision affirming the. 
magistrate's judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Clark 
guilty of misdemeanor trespass. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In August 2012 Mindy Montgomery, the director of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission, sent a letter to Clark barring Clark from entering Industrial 
Commission properties for one year. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 116, L. 21 - p. 117, L. 2, p. 
124, Ls. 1-11.) On August 27, 2013, Director Montgomery sent a second letter 
barring Clark from entering Industrial Commission properties for another year. 
(8/7/14 Tr., p. 116, L. 21 - p. 118, L. 15, p. 122, Ls. 3-16; Ex. 2.) This 2013 
letter was sent by facsimile and regular mail. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 118, L. 24 - p. 119, 
L. 1.) Director Montgomery was authorized to trespass individuals on behalf of 
the Industrial Commission. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 117, Ls. 14-17.) Before she sent the 
2013 letter, Director Montgomery confirmed the address and facsimile number 
were the most current addresses they had for Clark. (8/7 /14 Tr., p. 124, Ls. 15-
24.) The Industrial Commission received a receipt that the facsimile was sent. 
(8/7/14 Tr., p. 119, Ls. 2-11; Ex. 3.) The Industrial Commission also did not 
receive any "return to sender" or other correspondence indicating that the mailing 
address was incorrect. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 128, Ls. 2-16.) 
On April 4, 2014, Clark entered the Industrial Commission's office in 
Boise. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 130, L. 18 - p. 132, L. 14.) The customer service 
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representative at the front desk, Barbara Fox, recognized Clark and told him he 
was banned from the building and he had to leave. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 129, L. 21 - p. 
130, L. 1, p. 131, L. 12 p. 132, L. 20.) As part of her job responsibilities Ms. 
Fox can direct someone to leave the Industrial Commission building. (8/7/14 Tr., 
p. 136, L. 24 - p. 137, L. 3.) Ms. Fox directed Clark to leave the building, but he 
did not leave. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 132, L. 21 - p. 133, L. 1, p. 136, L. 24 - p. 137, L. 
9.) Ms. Fox told Clark that she would push the police button located under her 
desk if he did not leave. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 133, Ls. 2-7, p. 135, Ls. 12-15.) Clark 
told her to go ahead and push the button. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 133, Ls. 14-18.) Clark 
stayed in the reception area for about five minutes and only left when he saw the 
police arrive. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 133, L. 19 - p. 134, L. 1.) After the police arrived, 
Blair Jaynes, the Deputy Attorney General working with the Industrial 
Commission, signed a citation for trespass and the state charged Clark with 
misdemeanor trespass in violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(3). (8/7/14 Tr., p. 
156, Ls. 10-25, p. 158, Ls. 8-12; R., pp. 43-44, 60-61.) 
At trial, the state proceeded on two theories of trespass. The first theory 
was that Clark received the 2013 trespass letter and entered the Industrial 
Commission property anyway, and the second theory was that he did not 
immediately depart when Ms. Fox instructed him to leave. (R., pp. 61, 85.) The 
state called Director Montgomery, Ms. Fox, Officer Konvalinka (the responding 
officer), and Mr. Jaynes. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 116, L. 21 - p. 117, L. 2, p. 129, L. 21 -
p. 130, L. 1, p. 138, L. 22 - p. 139, L. 4, p. 156, Ls. 10-25.) The state also 
introduced a YouTube video posted by Clark. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 160, L. 4 - p. 161, 
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L. 3; Ex. 1.) In the video Clark is shown holding up the August 2012 trespass 
letter and saying "I just received another one, also." (8/7/14 Tr., p. 161, Ls. 13-
17; Ex. 1.) The second trespass letter was sent on August 27, 2013, and the 
YouTube video was posted on September 25, 2013. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 161, Ls. 9-
12; Exs. 2 and 3.) 
After the close of the state's evidence, Clark moved for a judgment of 
acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 169, L. 4- p. 170, L. 11.) 
Clark argued the state failed to prove the trespass orders were made by an 
authorized agent. (Id.) Specifically, he argued that because he was not afforded 
any opportunity to challenge the trespass orders, the orders themselves violated 
due process and, therefore, the Industrial Commission employees were not 
"acting in an authorized capacity" when they issued the orders. (Id.) The 
magistrate disagreed and found "there has been ample direct testimony that the 
people involved were authorized" and denied Clark's Rule 29 Motion. (8/7 /14 
Tr., p. 171, Ls. 15-19.) 
Clark presented the testimony of Eliane Kerr, a longtime friend who 
shares a house with Clark. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 172, L. 9 - p. 173, L.3.) Ms. Kerr 
testified she accompanied Clark to the Industrial Commission on April 4, 2014, 
but she had not previously seen the 2013 trespass letter. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 173, L. 
19 - p. 174, L. 14, p. 176, Ls. 5-13.) However, Ms. Kerr admitted that she does 
not open Clark's mail and would only know about a letter if Clark told her. 
(8/7/14 Tr., p. 178, Ls. 1-12.) Clark also testified. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 184, Ls. 8-10.) 
Clark admitted he received the 2012 trespass letter, but denied he received the 
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2013 trespass letter. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 186, Ls. 6-25.) When questioned about the 
YouTube video he testified he was not sure to what other document he was 
referring, but he was "almost sure" it was not another trespass letter. (8/7/14 Tr., 
p. 187, L. 12 - p. 188, L. 7.) Clark admitted the receptionist directed him to 
leave and also admitted that, when she threatened to call the police, he told her 
to go ahead and call the police. (8/7 /14 Tr., p. 191, L. 20 - p. 192, L. 16.) Clark 
also admitted that he had only had one address in Vancouver, Washington, and 
that both the 2012 and 2013 letters were addressed to that address. (8/7/14 Tr., 
p.196, L. 15-p.197, L. 6.) 
The jury found Clark guilty. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 234, L. 1 - p. 235, L. 10; R., p. 
91.) Clark then asked permission to make a motion for judgment of acquittal 
pursuant to Rule 29(c). (8/7/14 Tr., p. 236, Ls. 11-13.) The magistrate declined 
to hear the motion at that time but advised Clark he could make the motion if he 
provided the state notice. 1 (8/7/14 Tr., p. 236, Ls. 17-25.) The magistrate 
entered judgment and Clark timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 92-95.) 
On appeal to the district court, Clark claimed the magistrate erred by 
denying his Rule 29 motion. (R., pp. 113-117.) Clark argued he was not 
provided due process regarding the trespass order and therefore "there was 
insufficient evidence presented that the trespass order was provided by the 
'owner or the owner's authorized agent."' (R., p. 113.) Clark also claimed there 
1 In declining to take up the motion "ad hoc," the magistrate noted "I've ruled that 
same motion already and I'm not aware off the top of my head of anything that 
would invalidate the jury's verdict at this point." (8/7/14 Tr., p. 236, Ls. 20-23.) 
On intermediate appeal, the district court noted that Clark renewed his Rule 29 
motion at the close of all the proof. (R., p. 146.) 
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was not sufficient competent evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict because 
there was conflicting evidence. (R., pp. 118-119.) Specifically, Clark argued that 
there was conflicting testimony whether Officer Konvalinka came into the lobby 
to talk to a receptionist. (Id.) The district court analyzed State v. Pentico, 151 
Idaho 906, 914, 265 P.3d 519, 527 (Ct. App. 2011 ), and held that as long as 
Clark was given notice of the trespass restriction, the process of limiting his 
access to the Industrial Commission did not violate either the State or Federal 
Constitution. (R., pp. 145-150.) 
From these observations it must be concluded that the process of 
limiting the appellant's access to the Industrial Commission building 
did not violate the State or Federal Constitution, provided he was 
given notice of the restriction. The jury found, and the record 
supports the finding of the jury that he was notified of the restriction 
and violated that restriction. 
(R., p. 150.) The district court found there was substantial competent evidence 
to support a finding that Clark was served with the trespass notice. (R., p. 151.) 
The jury heard evidence that Mr. Clark was mailed and faxed a 
letter in August 2013 informing him that he was prohibited from 
entering Industrial Commission property for one year from an agent 
authorized to do so. Mr. Clark claimed he did not receive this letter, 
but the jury was entitled to find that testimony was not credible. 
The jury also heard testimony that after the receptionist informed 
him that he was prohibited from being on industrial commission and 
showed him the trespass letter, Mr. Clark refused to leave until the 
police arrived. There was substantial, competent evidence to 
support a finding that Mr. Clark was served with the trespass 
notice. 
(Id.) The district court affirmed the judgment of conviction. (R., p. 152.) Clark 
timely appealed. (R., pp. 154-156.) 
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ISSUES 
Clark states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the District Court erred by affirming the denial of 
Clark's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal; and 
2. Whether there was substantial and competent evidence to 
support the jury's verdict of guilty of Trespass pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 18-7008? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 2.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Clark failed to show the district court erred when it affirmed the 
magistrate's denial of Clark's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based on 
controlling Idaho case law? 
2. Has Clark failed to show the district court erred when it found there 




Clark Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Affirmed The 
Magistrate's Denial Of His Rule 29 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Clark argues the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's 
denial of his Rule 29 Motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-9.) Clark argues the state 
failed to show the Industrial Commission agents were authorized to issue 
trespass orders to Clark because the Industrial Commission did not provide 
Clark with due process to challenge the trespass orders. (Id.) Clark's argument 
is not supported by Idaho law. The district court did not err because the state 
provided sufficient evidence on all elements of trespass under Idaho Code § 18-
7008 to sustain a conviction. The state is only required to prove the elements of 
the offense and the state did so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate 
capacity, the appellate court reviews the decision of the district court directly. 
Pentico, 151 Idaho at 912, 265 P.3d at 525 (citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 
709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008)). The appellate court examines the 
record before the magistrate to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. kl (citing DeWitt, 145 
Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217). If the magistrate's findings are supported and 
the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's 
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decision, the appellate court affirms the district court's decision as a matter of 
procedure. kl (citing DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217). 
C. The State Was Not Required To Prove Clark Was Given Due Process To 
Challenge The Trespass Orders 
The state provided sufficient evidence to sustain Clark's conviction for 
trespass under Idaho Code § 18-7008 and the district court did not err when it 
affirmed the magistrate's decision denying Clark's Rule 29 motion. The 
magistrate correctly instructed the jury that it could find Clark guilty of trespass 
only if the state proved: 
1. On or about 4th day of April, 2014, 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant James Walter Clark, 
4. willfully entered real property after being notified in writing or 
verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the owner that he was 
banned from the property, within one year after being so notified, 
without permission or invitation,-
and / or 
wilfully refused to depart after being first notified by an authorized 
agent of the owner of real property to immediately depart, and 
5. the defendant was not on the real property under a landlord-
tenant relationship. 
(R., p. 85; see also§ 18-7008(8).) The state presented evidence to establish all 
of these elements. The state presented evidence that on April 4, 2014, Clark 
entered the Industrial Commission's office in Boise. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 130, L. 18 -
p. 132, L. 14.) Barbara Fox recognized Clark and told him he was banned from 
the building and he had to leave. (8/7 /14 Tr., p. 129, L. 21 - p. 130, L. 1, p. 131, 
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L. 12 - p. 132, L. 20.) As part of her job responsibilities Ms. Fox can direct 
someone to leave the Industrial Commission building. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 136, L. 24 -
p. 137, L. 3.) Ms. Fox directed Clark to leave the building, but he did not leave. 
(8/7/14 Tr., p. 132, L. 21 - p. 133, L. 1, p. 136, L. 24-p. 137, L. 9.) The state 
also presented evidence that Clark was not on the property in a landlord tenant 
relationship. (See 8/7 /14 Tr., p. 119, L. 2 - p. 121, L. 20; Exs. 2 and 3 (showing 
Clark's home address in Vancouver, Washington); see also 8/7/14 Tr., p. 177, 
Ls. 1-5 (testimony that Clark lives with Ms. Kerr).) The state also presented 
evidence that the Industrial Commission notified Clark in writing that he was 
barred from entering Industrial Commission property from August 27, 2013 to 
August 27, 2014. (See 8/7/14 Tr., p. 119, L. 2-p. 121, L. 20, Ex. 2.) The 
district court properly affirmed the magistrate's denial of Clark's Rule 29 Motion. 
(See R., pp. 150-152.) 
On appeal, Clark argues the state failed to prove that an "authorized 
owner or agent" barred him from the Industrial Commission, because no 
trespass from a public place can be "authorized" without due process. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 3-9.) Idaho law does not support Clark's argument. The 
state does not have to prove compliance with "due process" to support a 
conviction for trespass. See I.C. § 18-7008(8). 
In support of his argument, Clark cites to an Oregon Court of Appeals 
decision. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6 (citing State v. Koenig, 242 P.3d 649 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2010).) However, Koenig is inapplicable because the Oregon trespass 
statute differentiates between public and private premises and requires that, to 
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be guilty of trespass on "premises that are open to the public," the defendant 
must be "lawfully directed not to enter the premises." Koenig, 242 P.3d at 655 
(citing ORS 164.245(1 ), 164.205(3)(c).) Relying upon Oregon precedent, the 
Koenig court determined that "lawfully directed" required the state to prove at trial 
that the defendant was afforded due process to challenge the trespass order. kl 
at 655-656. This distinction between public and private trespass is not present in 
Idaho, nor is the language "lawfully directed" present in the Idaho trespass 
statute. See I.C. § 18-7008(8); see also Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909,265 P.3d at 
522; State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003). 
As the district court noted, and as Clark appears to recognize, the Idaho 
Court of Appeal's decision in Pentico is controlling. (See Appellant's brief, p. 5; 
R, pp. 148-150.) An officer informed Pentico that he was no longer authorized 
to visit the Governor's office in the Borah Building. Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909, 
265 P.3d at 522. Approximately a week later Pentico visited the Governor's 
office in the Borah Building. kl Pentico was charged with trespass under Idaho 
Code § 18-7008. Id. The magistrate found Pentico guilty of trespass and 
Pentico appealed. Id. On appeal Pentico argued, in part, that because public 
property was involved the state was required to provide a reason for excluding 
Pentico from the public property. kl at 911, 265 P.3d at 524. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals disagreed and held that the Idaho trespass statute does not 
distinguish between public and private property and does not require the owner 
or authorized agent to identify or even have a reason to order someone off the 
property. kl 
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Pentico also argues that, because public property was involved, the 
statute required the state to show a reason for excluding Pentico 
from the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floors of the Borah 
Building, and the department of education. However, the statute 
does not distinguish between public and private property and does 
not require the owner or authorized agent of the owner of real 
property to identify (or even have) a reason to ask a person to 
leave. Further, while Pentico asserts that only an inappropriately-
behaved citizen who has no legitimate business at a public office 
can be asked to leave and then be arrested for refusing to do so, 
Idaho courts have construed the statute to not require that public or 
private property owners provide a reason for asking a person to 
leave their land. Therefore, the magistrate did not err by 
concluding that Pentico had been properly asked to leave state 
property without an identified reason. 
~ at 911-912, 265 P.3d at 524-525 (internal citations omitted) If someone can 
be trespassed from public property without an identified reason then there can 
be no due process requirement to challenge that trespass order. Clark's 
argument that the state was required to prove he was given "due process" before 
he was trespassed from Industrial Commission property is without support in 
Idaho law. 
Clark's argument essentially boils down to a claim that, to sustain a 
conviction for trespass, the state was required to prove his constitutional rights 
were not violated. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-9.) However, it is well established 
that it is not the state's burden to prove the lack of a constitutional violation, 
rather it is the defendant's burden to allege and prove a constitutional violation. 
See ~ State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 382, 313 P.3d 1, 38 (2013) 
(defendant's burden to show constitutional due process rights violated), State v. 
Risdon, 154 Idaho 244, 252, 296 P .3d 1091, 1099 (Ct. App. 2012) (defendant's 
burden to show constitutional speedy trial rights were violated); State v. Puga, 
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111 Idaho 874, 876, 728 P.2d 398, 400 (Ct. App. 1986) (burden is on person 
asserting a constitutional violation to show the sentence is cruel and unusual). 
Clark made no effort to carry this burden in the trial court but instead attempted 
to shift the burden to the state to prove the lack of a constitutional violation. 
Because, for the reasons set forth above, the state was not required to prove 
compliance with due process as an element of trespass, Clark has failed to show 
the district court erred in affirming the denial of his Rule 29 motion. 
11. 
The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury Could Conclude, 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Clark Committed Trespass 
A. Introduction 
Clark contends there was not substantial and competent evidence to 
support the jury's verdict of guilty because he claims the testimony of Ms. Fox 
contradicted the testimony of Officer Konvalinka and Mr. Jaynes. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 10.) Clark argues there was a conflict regarding which Industrial 
Commission employee Officer Konvalinka spoke to and where that conversation 
took place. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) With whom the officer spoke and where 
that conversation took place is not relevant to the element of the state's theories 
of trespass. Any conflict of testimony would go to the credibility of witnesses and 
the determination of the credibility of witnesses is a jury question, not an 
appellate question. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011 ). An appellate 
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if 
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate 
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State 
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991 ). Moreover, the facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding 
the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
C. There Was No Conflict Between The Testimony Of Ms. Fox, Officer 
Konvalinka and Mr. Jaynes; And If There Was Conflict It Was A Credibility 
Determination For The Jury To Make 
Clark argues that Ms. Fox's testimony contradicted the testimony of 
Officer Konvalinka and Mr. Jaynes and should not have been used to convict 
Clark of trespass. (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) Clark argues that Ms. Fox testified 
that no police officer entered the Industrial Commission building and spoke with 
a commission employee, but Officer Konvalinka and Mr. Jaynes testified that an 
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officer did enter the Industrial Commission lobby and spoke with someone from 
the Industrial Commission. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
First, there was no real inconsistency between the testimony. Ms. Fox 
testified that someone else from the Industrial Commission talked to Officer 
Konvalinka. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 134, Ls. 2-7.) 
Q. And then did you talk with the police after they had arrived? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did another member of the Industrial Commission 
talk to police at that time? 
A. Yes. 
(8/7/14 Tr., p. 134, Ls. 2-7.) Officer Kovalinka testified that there were several 
people in the lobby, but he spoke to Mr. Jaynes and the receptionist but he did 
not remember the receptionist's name. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 141, Ls. 15-23, p. 143, L. 
15 - p. 144, L. 1.) Mr. Jaynes confirmed that he spoke with the police in the 
lobby. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 158, Ls. 8-15, p. 162, L. 24 - p. 163, L. 5.) Ms. Fox did not 
testify that she was present the entire time from Clark's arrival to the end of the 
encounter, nor did Ms. Fox testify that she was watching all of the interactions 
between the police and Industrial Commission staff. (See 8/7/14 Tr., p. 129, L. 
21 - p. 138, L. 2.) Therefore it is a perfectly reasonable inference that Ms. Fox 
could have left at some point (or left and come back) and the officer's 
conversation with someone whom he thought was the receptionist occurred while 
Ms. Fox was away. 
Even if there was a contradiction regarding which Industrial Commission 
employees spoke with the officers, or where those conversations took place, this 
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contradiction is irrelevant to the elements of trespass. (See R., p. 85 (elements 
instruction).) None of the elements depend on which Industrial Commission 
employee the officers spoke with and where these conversations took place. 
Finally, determining credibility of witnesses is for the jury to decide and the 
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury. See Miller, 131 
Idaho at 292,955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 
(Ct. App. 1991 ). Both the magistrate and district courts found that there was 
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. (8/7/14 Tr., p. 171, Ls. 15-19, 
p. 236, Ls. 17-25; R., pp. 150-151.) On appeal, Clark has failed to show the jury 
verdict was not supported by substantial competent evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
appellate decision upholding Clark's conviction for misdemeanor trespass. 
DATED this 21st day of September, 2015. 
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